Sanctions help, not hurt, Iran’s people

An Iranian man flashes the victory sign as an other holds the Iranian national flag during celebration in northern Tehran on July 14, 2015, after Iran’s nuclear negotiating team struck a deal with world powers in Vienna.

Under the 2015 nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iranian regime received tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief, plus the promise of new business from a variety of Western companies. Some people see this as a triumph of diplomacy which will improve the lives of the Iranian people, and engender good will. A common argument against economic sanctions is that that the private sector and a nation’s citizenry should not suffer as a result of the actions of the government.

The problem with this argument as it applies to Iran’s ruling theocracy is that there effectively is no private sector in Iran. In reality, the regime’s “privatization scheme” to create the appearance of a growing private sector primarily entails the transfer of state assets into the hands of a quasi- private sector comprised of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and a variety of its front companies and affiliates.

A closer look confirms that life has not improved for the Iranian people as a result of sanctions relief. They are suffering the same rampant unemployment, and they are still being brutally repressed by hardline institutions including the IRGC. In fact, the Islamic Republic is in the midst of an ever-escalating crackdown on activists, journalists, dual nationals, and anyone deemed to be a threat to the theocratic system.

Under the 2015 nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iranian regime received tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief, plus the promise of new business from a variety of Western companies. Some people see this as a triumph of diplomacy which will improve the lives of the Iranian people, and engender good will. A common argument against economic sanctions is that that the private sector and a nation’s citizenry should not suffer as a result of the actions of the government. The problem with this argument as it applies to Iran’s ruling theocracy is that there effectively is no private sector in Iran. In reality, the regime’s “privatization scheme” to create the appearance of a growing private sector primarily entails the transfer of state assets into the hands of a quasi- private sector comprised of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and a variety of its front companies and affiliates. A closer look confirms that life has not improved for the Iranian people as a result of sanctions relief. They are suffering the same rampant unemployment, and they are still being brutally repressed by hardline institutions including the IRGC. In fact, the Islamic Republic is in the midst of an ever-escalating crackdown on activists, journalists, dual nationals, and anyone deemed to be a threat to the theocratic system.